Cooperation from the islanders was negligible; they resorted to passive resistance and showed their rejection to the invaders in every possible opportunity. In some cases, the islanders even helped the British troops by providing intelligence and guidance on the terrain.
This paper assesses the experience of the Argentine occupation. How did this small, tightly-knit community cope with the traumatic event of an occupation? How did the Argentine military personnel act and react during this period? In short, how did they conduct the occupation? How separated were the cultures of both occupiers and occupied?
This paper describes the contact between the groups, the Argentine soldiers and the islanders. When the Argentines occupied the islands it was evident from the beginning that they were considered by the inhabitants not only as strangers with no invitation but also intruders. Most of the islanders were fourth or fifth generation descendants of the first settlers back in 1833. To the Argentines, their action was just and justified by the memory of a territory lost to the British Empire.
Most of the military occupations had been conducted by a more advance or developed society over a less developed group or society. The Falklands/Malvinas is an opposite case; a less developed society embarks in the occupation of a more developed society. The situation is also compounded by the presence in one of the parts of a political regime that applied high levels of political violence against opposition.
Military occupations are hazardous most of the times because small stories generated from the interaction difficult to be controlled between both parts can have big effects on the overall success of the occupation.
The paper looks at different aspects in the process of a military occupation:
previous knowledge about the other by the parts; the Argentine plan for the occupation; the failed intents by the Argentines to win the heart and minds of the islanders; situations of cultural clash; the activities and attitude of resistance and rejection developed by the islanders; the ever presence of uncertainty and fear generated by the situation; the existence of negative views, in this particular case, towards the islanders from Argentines and British; and the islanders attitude toward the British after the liberation.
The basic assumption of this work is that Argentine and islanders cultures clashed at the level of identity. This one expresses itself in the customs, names of geographic places, religion, and national symbols. How did this small, tightly-knit community cope with the traumatic event of an occupation? How did the Argentine military personnel act and react during this period? In short, how did they conduct the occupation? How separated were the cultures of both occupiers and occupied?
Until now this story has been told in a fragmentary form, scattered through different sources. This paper is intent to put these fragments together and to count this experience from both sides. This analysis does not center on the lasting effects of the occupation in the memories of both sides and how they affect the diplomatic relations.
Sources material are accounts of direct participants or witnesses that are as close as possible in time to the operation and written material over the experience already published from both sides.
Previous knowledge
The Argentine troops sailing to storm the beaches near Port Stanley in the Falklands Islands on April 2, 1982 had little idea who the islanders really were, how they would respond to their action or about their way of life. One reason could be attributed to the hurry that assisted Argentines to launch the operation for the military occupation of the Malvinas triggered by the crisis in the South Georgias Island. Another reason, according to Argentine law the islanders were born in Argentine soil, thus automatically they were Argentines citizens. Another predominant opinion was that the islanders were simply British settlers. Finally, Argentine diplomacy had been always focused in the diplomatic battle without accepting the islander wishes, as was Great
Britain's position. Whatever the reasons, the Argentine forces approaching to the islands had had no time or the experience to confront the new situation they were going to generate. Consequently there was no much information about the particular characteristic of the population. This ignorance opened the door for problems and misunderstandings. In 1966, an Argentine visitor wrote:
"Nearly the whole islands' population is British descendant. Despite that, the natives felt themselves weakly linked to Great Britain. They do not know that territory and, under the best circumstances, they only have distant relatives.
orderliness. Port Stanley [Puerto Argentino] and the settlements were like something picture from a postcard. The air was dust free, the streets clean, the number of vehicles so few that the exhaust fumes were soon whisked away by South Atlantic winds". The former military governor, general Menéndez, explained that the knowledge that many islanders had about Argentines were acquire through this massive presence of tourists in the islands:
"What the islanders got to know about the Argentines "started with the arrival of the avalanche of tourist brought by the big cruiser ships to Port Stanley. And they had very bad image because they painted on the walls 'The Malvinas are Argentine'. Because the population liked to take care of their homes they had to paint back the walls. They did not like to do that…All these situations created a very negative image of the Argentines. What was worst was the shoplifting of merchandise from the shops. Consequently, some closed their businesses when the tourists arrived or asked friends for help to keep an eye on the customers" 18 Nat Bound, a Port Stanley store owner also added that, the problem was that the population of the town was small and the contingents of tourists were large, consequently they were hard to watch. According to Bound, after a while, the tourists became bore and they don't know what to do. Then, "they started to knock at the doors of the pubs after closing time, or they, practically 'assaulted' the stores. The worst thing for Bound was that fact many tourists knocked at the doors or ring at the houses of the islanders with the excuse of fraternize.
19
One Argentine commentator regretted that Argentine positive actions toward the island population were barely taking into account:
"However, all the Argentines´ positives actions towards the islanders -like providing teachers, weekly connecting flights, petrol, gasoline, and gas-did not make a great impression on the 'kelpers', whose families had settled their three, four, or even five generations ago. They did not distinguish between the historical validity of the Argentine claim and the concrete reality of their forefathers…In case of Argentine administration of the Islands, the locals wanted to know for sure how the extent to which their orderly life, their social tranquility and their calm coexistence would be threatened. For them we have had a bad name as [not very] efficient administrators. I have to admit that they are not much off the mark…".
20
Finally, Foulkes also explains that among many Argentines there was ignorance about the possible behavior of the "nativos malvineros" (islanders). As an example he cites the case of a radio commentator who was himself convinced that the islanders would salute the recuperation of the islands by the Argentines because "they were liberated from the colonial yoke".
21

Plans for the occupation
What it is accepted today is that Argentines wanted to conduct a model occupation by producing a cordial relation between them and the occupied. Some time after the war, the Argentine military governor explained more detailed the nature and purpose of what he and the government thought about the occupation:
"After seventeen years of negotiations with the United Kingdom, Argentina had made many proposals regarding the local population that should not be set aside because we were now the occupants of the islands. On the contrary, we have to teach a lesson and demonstrate that we were honest in keeping our promises. Moreover, we have to show that we were capable of conducting a good government beneficial to the local population".
22
"The main concept was to introduce first the indispensable changes and then gradually implement the rules convenient and necessary in order to integrate the islands and their population with the rest of the country…" 23 "Both the National Strategy and Military Strategy Directives prepared for the Malvinas mentioned a series of items that whoever was in charge of the military government had to consider. For instance, to respect as much as possible the population's lives and possessions during the military occupation… They also talked about trying to maintain and respect the customs, essential rights of the inhabitants, and even more, to improve their living standards."
In 1966, there was a lunch between high ranking British Foreign Office officials and Argentine diplomats in a "deniable scenario" to talk informally about the British ideas concerning the island's future. During the conversations, the British suggested that "if you like to conquer the hearts and minds of the islander Argentines would try to befriend with the islanders and demonstrate that with Argentina their situation would be better". In order to obtain that, communication and understanding were necessary.
25
That proposal was fulfill later when both governments signed the Communication Agreements in the early seventies. 26 They opened the door to Argentines to assist in the development of the islands and to generate a more fluid contact with the islands population. However, after twelve years, the relationship had not matured enough.
Thus, during the short occupation Argentines tried a new strategy of using "mirrors and beads" towards the islanders:
"The very first thing they [the military] wanted off was that container of televisions sets for the kelpers. I thought that was disgusting; the army needed ammunition and food far more urgently than the kelpers needed those televisions sets, but it was a political decision".
27
"Those days we received a very precious present sent by the government of the province of Misiones: it was a colour transmition TV station…we wanted to introduce through the TV cultural elements, our language and our way of life. It was important to counter the negative campaign that they had been receiving so far. The inconvenience was that from the continent they sent us programming and shows that were only comprehensive to the Argentines because the islanders had no knowledge of Spanish language or the slang or archetypical human types. In order for them to know that Argentina has good music, they would be much better off listening to our folk music or watching a program with the Buenos Aires Symphonic Orchestra. We had to give them a good idea of our cultural level and not allow them to continue believing that we were feathered Indians".
28
"Those television sets were part of the 'hearts and minds' policy by which the Argentine administration hoped to win over the Falklands civilians. Two hours of transmission were relayed each evening from the mainland"
When the Argentines departed, the television sets were "only able to play video However, we never participated in that game… we never treated them as allies because they never were that. We separated them, and restricted their mobility."
31
"We have to be extremely careful with all that, because the islanders are pretty closed minded, typical of island peoples: closed minded, selfsufficient, and distrustful…We promoted talks with the population, they voiced inquires and complaints that could have been on small subjects, but all their concerns were attended to. This way, there was a starting point to establish a bonding with the population…It was a starting point but it ended as soon as the Task Force arrived to the islands." 32 "To show how well the Argentines treated the islanders, it can only be said that at the government building there was a claims office. There, Argentine paid for every chicken or lamb that the troops captured for feeding themselves, every Land Rover o house requisited for the using of the troops was religiously paid and to very high prices as the kelper claimed. They appraised by themselves how much money would cost the damaged produced."
33
Cultural clash
It is clear that Argentine culture differs from that of the British. Consequently, cultural clashes might be expected. In his recollections of an earlier visit to the Islands in 1976, the Argentine journalist Haroldo Foulkes, expresses the shock suffered by any Argentine visitors when visiting the South Atlantic territory:
"Truly, to me it was very alienating to step on Argentine land, and feel myself trapped in a typical British environment. It was strange and shocking at the same time. For it was not only the language, the style of the houses, the human behavior so different to ours…told me that I was in a different world".
34
Cultural clashes are problematic because, although no matter how minor they could appear, they seem to threat the identity of the occupied. In this case, these conflicts evolved about four issues: customs, driving; the names of geographic locations and places; symbolic, the Crown; and religion: catholic versus Anglican.
"The Falklands civilians protested when an order was issued that all local vehicles should change from driving on the left to the right-hand side of the road. Captain Hussey pointed out that one reason for the change was concern for the safety of the civilians. 'Which would you prefer, that our eighteen-year-old conscripts, with their big lorries, should try to drive on the left, or that you, with your little vehicles, change to the right?'".
35
"There is a worthy anecdote because the islanders complained a lot about it. This was the change of driving circulation. They complained about how could we say wouldn't change their customs when we were doing precisely that. We had to convince them that it was safer for them to drive on the opposite side than for our drivers, who were not used to driving on the leftside, and having heavy trucks on the wrong side was much more dangerous …" "This state of affairs was of course highly pleasing to the Argentinians, who added insult to injury during the flights by giving the instructions for the life-saving equipment only in Spanish! The lesson was quite clear: if you wished to be saved, you should learn Spanish". 40 Finally, it is possible to find a contradictory sense about the occupation of the islands among some Argentines troops related to identity: "There was a pretty strange sensation: one knows that the land was ours, but one saw people that did not speak our language. The first day, a lady came to us and with the help of signals offered us a cup of coffee, but the order of our superior officer was that it was forbidden to accept anything from the kelpers, we explained the best we could that we wanted it but could not accept it." 41 An older conscript soldier remembered that for him: "it was an intellectual contradiction to think that we were in our land. Truly, it looked more as if we were invading an English coastal village".
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Resistance and rejection
The newly appointed military governor, General Menéndez, later told a journalist that they did not expect serious problems, but they found a certain attitude of rejection:
"There was an attitude of prevention, probably some fear. Certainly we could not expect much in Puerto Argentino [Port Stanley], because there, the most recalcitrant members of the Falklands Islands Company had influence. 39 Middlebrook, Task Force, p. 172. 40 "I met some of them [members of the FIDF] and explained that if they did some wrong to the occupying troops, I would apply the laws of war against them. I also told them that there was a group of two or three youngsters that continuously were gesticulating or showed an aggressive attitude against the Argentine officers and NCOs. For instance, they used to approach at an excessive speed and pass our troops very closely. I told them that if they ran into one of them or threw them to the floor and somebody fired at them, although I did not like martyrs, I was going to justify what my men did."
44
The Argentine First Lieutenant Esteban in Darwin:
"We believed that the [British] landing was imminent, and I did not want the children around; also, some of the civilians had seemed hostile and uncooperative. They had left lights on at night, let animals out on to our minefields and sometimes cut off the water and petrol…".
45
The islanders made clear from the very beginning that they rejected the Argentines and comments on how could be possible that the occupiers expected to be welcomed by the population as liberators. Middlebrook tells of Bob Rutherford´s attitude towards the occupiers: "You can walk past a person without being aggressive but letting them know they were not wanted. I believe many of the lower ranks of Argentinians were disillusioned to find no crowds in the streets waving Argentine Flags".
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"During one house search we came inside the house of an islander couple. The husband seemed to be calm…but, the wife on the other hand, was very nervous…Suddenly, the woman turned on the record player…She opened the windows and turned up the volume. I believe it was the British national anthem…"
47
When a large group of Argentine reporters visited the islands for a day, the owner of the Upland Goose Hotel explained how they were disappointed, as "they all came 43 Menéndez in Turolo, p. 68. 44 Ibid. p. 80-81. 45 "we treated them as if they were our allies but truly, they never were that. The directives were: 'they are Argentineans', but they were not and never will be. They always wanted to make perfectly clear the relation of rejection and reticence. In any case, our exchanges were economic only (or limited to trade) ."
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The only Argentine TV reporter in the islands during the duration of the conflict, Nicolás Kasanzew remembers that "the islanders attitude towards Argentina was absolutely negative. They showed all the time, an attitude of boycott in order to underline their contempt and hate towards us. However, they never avoided to do profitable business with the Argentines."
51
Uncertainty and fear
The arrival of a large contingent of heavily armed foreign troops to any "My wife phoned and said there was a soldier at the front gate but he could not speak English. I went home quickly and found that a vehicle had arrived and there were several men, revolvers in hands, I believe under an NCO. They burst into the house and insisted that my wife and two daughters and I should all pack…They told me I could choose to leave my wife and children behind. 'You will only be gone two or three days," they said. It was a very difficult decision to take. They came up to the bedroom, threatening my wife and daughters, hurrying us to get packed. My daughters were crying and my wife was on the verge. We talked very quickly and decided on the spur of the moment that it would be better to leave them. It was the most terrifying moment of my life. I didn´t expect to see my family again and they didn't expect to see me again. I didn't know where we were going and asked if I needed my passport, but they said it would be 'internal'".
52
But fear of the presence of foreign people was mutual. Second Lieutenant Gómez
Centurión, then 23 years old, remembers that during the occupation of small village of Darwin, "we searched the houses with a sergeant and three soldiers. The soldiers distrusted the people that spoke in a foreign language; everything was foreign and aggressive to them. I tried to keep a more relaxed and a little more accommodating attitude… When we searched a house, the soldiers waited outside, they were very tense, with the weapons ready."
53
An Army conscript, of the class 1963, Ricardo Peralta, tells the story of small acts of rejection by islander youngsters. How he reacted to one of these events could depicts one case of how small incidents can have a potential large negative and durable impact in small communities:
"The islanders' kids did all the possible to disturb us. They pulled my leg every time I went for my meal. My look was frightening after living in the foxholes and working with the mines. I was all black, covered with mud. One day, I was going to eat and walked near a group of kids who were on the playground. I do not understand English but I had the feeling that they were making jokes about me and that angered me. I left the meal can and I cocked the FAL and pointed it at the head of a small girl. I know it was brutal, but they never bothered me again."
54
Although there in no record of the little girl's parents reaction when they were informed about the incident, it is hardly not to imagine that it could have been very negative for the Argentines.
According to an islander, Graham Bound, "there had been a number of incidents that proved how vulnerable islanders were". He gave an example: "a machine gunner with a twitchy trigger finger had riddled Monsignor Spraggon's home, blowing the toilet away from beneath the elderly cleric and leaving him in a stunned but uninjured heap on the floor…Similarly, a machine gunner defending troops in what once been the Stanley senior school fell asleep over his gun and ventilated a nearby cottage in which two single women lived. Remarkably, neither was injunred." 55 Uncertainty and fear were not only felt by individuals, it could also be a collective experience. According to BBC war reporter Robert Fox, the community of Goose Green (Darwin) "received a bigger shock than almost any other in the two months of Argentinean occupation. The people suffered air raids and bombardment, and a day of battle, and they had endured twenty-nine days of captivity during which the threat of what might happen was worse than any physical deprivation or violence …By the time I left many had yet to come to terms with the violence and fear stirred up by the campaign."
56
Islanders´ attitude toward the British soldiers after liberation
Argentine occupation of the Malvinas ended June 14, 1982. After 74 days, the islands became Falklands again. Although it was a joyous moment for the islanders, it seemed quite the opposite to the liberators. Anthony Barnett, was surprised by the islanders' attitude after Argentine surrender was announced: "what should have been a moment of jubilation was met merely with enigmatic reserve by the kelpers [sic] themselves. 57 He cites British journalists´ reports:
"at times it was hard to believe that they (the Falklanders) had any connection with the war. They behaved, it sometimes appeared, like peasants caught in an eighteenth century European dynastic clash…".
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"The islander never seemed particularly glad to see us…".
59
The war had changed the life of the inhabitant, and for the time being they were not happy with the presence of British troops: One day after the liberation, the war correspondent that walked all the way from the beaches of San Carlos to Port Stanley with the British soldiers badly needed a cup of tea and he asked innocently, "could I put some water in here so I could make a cup of tea?" The replay was: "Use the tap in the garden, I've got washing up in the kitchen sink". According to the journalist, "he shuffled off, hoping against hope that one day a member of the household…would knock on his door in England asking a favor."
64
Negative views on the islanders: Argentine and British perspectives
Related to the previous section, Argentines felt frustrated toward the islanders' attitude and way of life. What is interesting was that they were not alone. Dean, 1984, p. 53. "beyond a shadow of any doubt, the Argentinians were responsible for wholesale looting and vandalism while they occupied Stanley". And they explain that "in the Junior School, troops who had been there…had defecated throughout the classrooms and cloakrooms…" 79 Twenty five years after the invasion, some islanders think that civilians were well treated by the Argentines troops. Regarding the cases of burglary, these were incursions by soldiers searching for food on abandoned houses or henhouses.
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Reflections
During an interview, General Menéndez as former military governor of the islands expressed the following considerations:
Journalist: but you appeared to be in a certain way to be commanding an occupation force in your own territory. Menéndez : "I never wanted to be so. I could have concentrated the population in one place and tell the British: 'Watch out, they are there, don't fire!'. If I had done that I would had had one problem solved and I could have forgotten about controlling them if they were using radio, or making signals or if they had concealed weapons…" 81 Some time later, Haroldo Foulkes, the journalist expert on the Malvinas, wrote that after of what he called a "frustrated war" there was a case of lack of foresight from the Argentine leaders not to consider the sentiments of the islanders when confronting the Argentine military occupation. Consequently, for him it was natural that they showed a mood opposing the presence of the troops and that they did try to help the British forces by sending useful information.
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Menéndez was also asked if he thought that there could have been some sort of collaboration or acceptance of the Argentines, provided he had stayed in the islands a longer time. Menéndez answered:
"I am sure. But it will not happen while we are unable to educate a whole generation of islanders in the knowledge, and consequently, in the appreciation of the Argentine history, geography, and all other Argentine aspects of life. We cannot expect that they will change their views if they The outspoken journalist Nicolás Kasanzew also produced some interesting point of view from the perspective of the occupier:
"At all times, the kelpers exaggerated the discomfort we produced to them and they invented imaginary prosecutions or inexistent grievances… The kelpers like the British only show respect when they are confronted forcefully. Because the Argentines never applied force against the population and treated them with velvet gloves they showed more and more disrespect.
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A few years later an islander presents the opposite view:
"It has been suggested that a lot of nonsense has been talked about life under Occupation. An easy statement -seventy-four days dismissed without further thought. Admittedly things could had been worse, but it was not an easy or pleasant time for 500 or so folk left in Stanley, nor a time which any of us would ever wish to repeat".
85
Finally, Kasanzew, concluded that "the kelpers were our arch-enemies. From the very first moment they were going to be fifth columnist. I wasn't mistaken. I also understood from the start that they were never to be gained to the Argentine cause."
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Conclusions
The 74 days Argentine occupation of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands is a clear example that this type of operation needs troops to be prepared to cope with a situation which is not related to combat. They need to have some minimal understanding of the situation and, if possible of the language.
It is also another example how difficult is for occupiers to conduct a successful occupation if they act without any invitation.
This case also shows that military occupation is a very complex endeavor.
Finally, in the long story of military occupations experiences, most of them failed, then it is not surprising that Argentine also failed. Consequently, it was not a "model occupation". However, it is interesting to note that against of what could have been expected from an Argentine occupation in that time period, the experience resulted in a mild occupation. The islander suffered an important disruption in their normal lives but, considering the high levels of force applied by both contestants, there were levels of violence against islander population were low and the amount of property resulted small.
